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THE FRONTIER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
ALEXANDRA B. KLASS*
The Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New
London brought the issues of takings and public use into the
national spotlight. A groundswell of opposition to govern-
ment-initiated "economic development takings" led to emi-
nent domain reform legislation in over forty states. Many
people are surprised to learn, however, that another type of
economic development taking is alive and well in many west-
ern states that are rich in natural resources. In those states,
oil, gas, and mining companies have the power of eminent
domain under state constitutions or state statutes to take
private property to develop coal, oil, or other natural re-
sources. In fact, the Supreme Court's deference to such
"natural resource development takings" in the early part of
the twentieth century was the base upon which the Court
built its decision in Kelo. This Article first explores the rela-
tionship between Kelo-type economic development takings
and natural resource development takings, and argues that
the national reaction to Kelo has focused too narrowly on
government takings and ignored the impact of private tak-
ings. It then uses recent property reforms in the Interior
West to explore the broader implications of the role of emi-
nent domain in reallocating property in society and proposes
some additional reforms for natural resource development
takings.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
Ann Burkhart, Dan Gifford, John Echeverria, Eric Freyfogle, Brad Karkkainen,
Jim Krier, John Copeland Nagle, Myron Orfield, Jack Palma, J.B. Ruhl, and
Sandi Zellmer for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also
benefited greatly from comments received at a Squaretable presentation at the
University of Minnesota Law School in June 2007. Gretchen Lander provided ex-
cellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the law of eminent domain captured the attention
of the public at large. Suddenly, everyone cared about public
use, takings, and the Fifth Amendment.' As a result of the
Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London,2 the
issue of what constituted a public use for purposes of eminent
domain authority dominated the media, dinner conversations,
state and federal legislative sessions, and highway billboards.
The public was shocked and outraged to learn that city officials
could take a private home to facilitate a new corporate head-
quarters, and that a state could replace "any Motel Six with a
Ritz Carlton. ' 3 Although the Supreme Court had upheld simi-
lar takings prior to its decision in Kelo, the public now had
taken notice, was not happy, and wanted to make sure gov-
ernment officials could not knock on the doors of the nation's
citizens with the same authority.
In many natural resource-rich areas of the country, how-
ever, the knock on the door is less likely to come from a gov-
ernment official and much more likely to come from a mining,
oil, or gas company representative. Once again, this is nothing
new. Since the early twentieth century, state constitutions and
legislative enactments in the Interior West have given broad
authority to natural resource developers to exercise the power
of eminent domain directly to promote development of coal, oil,
gas, and other state natural resources. These "natural re-
source development takings" have much in common with the
Kelo-type "economic development takings" currently in the na-
tional spotlight. 4 Both types of takings grant the condemnor
the right to displace private property interests in the name of
economic development that will benefit the public at large.
1. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads in relevant part "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
3. See id. at 503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. An "economic development taking" can be defined generally as a taking
where a government entity takes private property by eminent domain and then
transfers it to another private entity (usually a commercial one) with the goal of
creating more jobs and generating higher tax revenue for the community. Tho-
mas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1880 (2007).
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So how do these two types of takings relate? Does the na-
tional reaction to Kelo have any impact on natural resource de-
velopment takings? Should it? Natural resource development
takings are a much more direct form of "private to private"
transfer of property in that the benefited private entity has
statutory authority to initiate eminent domain proceedings on
its own. By contrast, the benefited private entity in a tradi-
tional economic development taking must rely on a state or lo-
cal government to initiate eminent domain proceedings. Thus,
there is at least on the surface a more "public" aspect to tradi-
tional economic development takings. 5 Nevertheless, oppo-
nents of economic development takings rarely, if ever, question
the validity of natural resource development takings or advo-
cate for removing them from the definition of "public use."
Part I of this Article explores the importance of natural re-
source development takings in shaping the law of eminent do-
main. This Part focuses on state statutes, constitutional provi-
sions, and case law in the early nineteenth century that
broadly interpreted "public use" to enlist private industry to
develop state natural resources and promote economic prosper-
ity. Part II highlights the central role natural resource devel-
opment takings played in the Court's Kelo decision and then
suggests that the public debate over economic development
takings since Kelo has missed the opportunity for a more ro-
bust analysis of eminent domain because it focuses exclusively
on government takings and ignores private takings.
Part III considers more broadly the role of natural resource
development takings on what was once the American "Fron-
tier." It then turns to recent judicial and legislative property
reforms within the Interior West that in part flow from Kelo
but in some cases are more tailored to the issues and needs of
the region. These reforms consist primarily of additional pro-
cedural rights for landowners in eminent domain actions and
additional rights for surface owners on split-estate lands. In
enacting these reforms, Interior West states are moving in the
right direction but should go further and reconsider the con-
tinuing need for a per se public use designation for natural re-
source development.
5. See Rebecca Huntington, Condemned, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007,
at 4 (discussing natural resource development takings in Idaho and other Interior
West states and noting that in those states "private entities don't even need the
government as a go-between").
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Finally, Part IV explores some proposals for reform, argu-
ing that such reforms must be tailored to the specific needs and
economies of each state. These proposals focus on creating a
forum at the state or local government level in which to balance
natural resource development against competing development
and open space interests. This process would replace the cur-
rent default public use designation for natural resource devel-
opment. States can implement such changes through proce-
dural reforms similar to those many states have adopted in
connection with economic development takings or, better, by
creating new procedures modeled after state and federal envi-
ronmental review laws to study and debate the competing eco-
nomic, environmental, and social concerns at issue in natural
resource development takings today.
I. NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AS A "PUBLIC USE"
All agree that "the sovereign may not take the property of
A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private
party B, even though A is paid just compensation."6 While this
may be true, it is also true in many states that private party B
may bring its own action for eminent domain to take the prop-
erty of private party A if private party B's activity is the devel-
opment of natural resources. This Part traces the history of
constitutional and statutory authority for natural resource de-
velopment takings. It then focuses specifically on the rhetoric
used by early courts to justify or to reject natural resource de-
velopment takings as a public use. In these decisions, courts in
the Interior West speak passionately about the critical depend-
ence of their states on the private exploitation of timber, oil,
minerals, water, and other natural resources, while Eastern
state courts speak just as passionately about the sanctity of
private property. This divide shows the important role emi-
nent domain played in ensuring that states' allocations of prop-
erty rights in the early twentieth century reflected their indi-
vidual values and needs.
6. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. This prohibition on transfers of private property
derives from the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states in rele-
vant part "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
[Vol. 79
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A. Early Constitutional and Statutory Authority for
Natural Resource Development Takings
In the early nineteenth century, legislatures in many
Eastern and Midwestern states delegated eminent domain au-
thority to private transportation and manufacturing companies
in order to promote "economic expansion in a country with very
little surplus capital. ' 7 State courts generally upheld such
delegations on grounds that the needs and wants of the com-
munity at that time were served by economic expansion and
thus the companies' use of eminent domain was for a public
rather than a private purpose. 8 During the latter half of the
nineteenth century, however, some courts in these same states
applied (albeit for a short time) a narrower concept of public
use in order to preserve the rights of property owners. Under
this approach, a taking that would benefit a private party could
be upheld only if the project would actually be open to use by
the public. 9
By the early twentieth century, these courts overwhelm-
ingly returned to a broad construction of public use, defining it
not as "use by the public" but as any "public purpose," at least
when it came to government-initiated eminent domain ac-
tions.10 These same courts, however, retained the narrow view
of public use when it came to reviewing state laws allowing
7. See Charles Fels et al., The Private Use of Public Power: The Private Uni-
versity and the Power of Eminent Domain, 27 VAND. L. REV. 681, 690-92 (1974).
8. Id. at 692-93 (citing Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694,
726-28 (1832)).
9. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 259-61 (1977) (discussing judicial trends in the middle of the nine-
teenth century to no longer accept "what before had been a standard and virtually
unchallenged utilitarian justification" for private eminent domain actions in fur-
therance of general economic development); Fels et al., supra note 7, at 694-95
(citing Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 336-37 (1877); Bloodgood v. Mohawk &
H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837)); see also Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Pub-
lic Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 617 (1940) (stating
that by the 1850s "a narrower construction of the term 'public use' began to
emerge, according to which public benefit was insufficient, and public use began
to be defined as use by the public.").
10. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479-80 (stating that while many state courts in
the mid-nineteenth century adopted the "use by the public" definition of public
use, this narrow view eroded over time and when the Supreme Court began to ap-
ply the Fifth Amendment to the states at the end of the nineteenth century, "it
embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public
purpose"'); see also Fels et al., supra note 7, at 702-04; Nichols, supra note 9, at
626-27.
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private entities to exercise the power of eminent domain for
economic development. For instance, in 1913 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state statute that
granted mining companies the power of eminent domain to
build roads and tramways to convey materials for mining pur-
poses. 11 The court reasoned that the owner of private property
has the uninterrupted use and enjoyment of the property sub-
ject only "to the sovereign right of the state to take so much of
it as may be necessary to serve .. .public uses[.1" 12 According
to the court, even if the mining company were to allow the pub-
lic to use the roads and tramways after they were constructed,
the company is not a public service corporation and would be
constructing the tramways at its own expense, for its own pur-
poses. 13 The court concluded that "a private business corpora-
tion has no public use to serve, and hence cannot properly be
invested with the privilege of taking private property for pri-
vate uses." 14
Courts in Illinois, Virginia, and West Virginia, among oth-
ers, reached similar conclusions during this same time period
and invalidated state laws authorizing coal companies, timber
companies, and other private industries to exercise the power
of eminent domain to create roads and transportation networks
to move their products. 15 In each case, the court refused to
support the legislature's declaration that the promotion of the
industry in question was a "public use" and held instead that
11. Philadelphia Clay Co. v. York Clay Co., 88 A. 487 (Pa. 1913).
12. Id. at 488.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 489.
15. See Sholl v. German Coal Co., 10 N.E. 199 (Ill. 1887) (invalidating state
statute authorizing condemnation of land for extension of a tramway to facilitate
transportation of the company's coal); Boyd v. C.L. Ritter Lumber Co., 89 S.E. 273
(Va. 1916) (invalidating state statute allowing lumber company to condemn right-
of-way over neighbor's property to haul lumber even where company would allow
the public to use the right-of-way); Hench v. Pritt, 57 S.E. 808 (W. Va. 1907) (in-
validating as unconstitutional statute allowing saw mill to condemn land for rail-
road connection to transport product). But see Johnston v. Ala. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 252 So. 2d 75 (Ala. 1971) (holding that statute granting right-of-way
condemnation authority to mining, manufacturing, power and quarrying opera-
tions does not violate the state constitution); Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker, 59
Ga. 420 (1877) (gold company can exercise right of eminent domain for right-of-
way over unoccupied lands because development of mineral resources of the state
from which constitutional currency is stamped is of public benefit); Jones v.
Mahaska County Coal Co., 47 Iowa 35 (1877) (holding that coal company can con-
demn land for a road but only if it allows the public and other industry to use the
road).
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the exercise of eminent domain by such private businesses was
inconsistent with the state constitution. 16
During this same time period, however, states in the Inte-
rior West were in the process of creating their economies and
their first state constitutions. The founders in these states
were less concerned with preservation of private property
rights and more focused on developing their natural resources
as quickly as possible by encouraging private mining, oil and
gas development, forestry, and other industry. 17 As a result,
the constitutions of these new states often included explicit
provisions declaring that private parties could exercise the
power of eminent domain in furtherance of mining, irrigation,
forestry, or manufacturing. For instance, the constitutions of
Colorado (1876), Idaho (1890), Wyoming (1890), and Arizona
(1911) all declare that private property may be taken for pri-
vate uses that include reservoirs, drains, flumes, or ditches
across the lands of others for agricultural, mining, milling, do-
mestic, or sanitary purposes. 18 These provisions allowed pri-
vate companies to file their own condemnation actions in state
court to obtain private property in furtherance of natural re-
source development, without any need for state or local gov-
ernmental officials to participate in the eminent domain action
or make any further determination that an individual private
taking was for a public use or in the interests of the public.
In enacting these constitutional provisions, the state foun-
ders knew exactly what they were doing. The Idaho Constitu-
tion declares that the taking of private property for construc-
tion of reservoirs, storage basins, canals, railroads, tramways,
shafts, drainage of mines, dumps, "or any other use necessary
to the complete development of the material resources of the
16. See Scholl, 10 N.E. at 201-02; Boyd, 89 S.E. at 275-76; Hench, 57 S.E. at
809-10.
17. See Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Alloca-
tion by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 244-45
(1973) (discussing the popularity of constitutional provisions and statutes author-
izing private rights of eminent domain in western states in the late nineteenth
century based on "the hardships of life in arid lands and mountain fastnesses, the
nature of the resource base, vast distances, and, above all, men's impatience to
force the pace of economic development").
18. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 14; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 32; see also ROBERT B. KEITER & TIM
NEWCOMB, THE WYOMING STATE CONSTITUTION 67 (1993) (stating that "private
eminent domain or private condemnation" is "a unique feature found in many
western state constitutions").
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state ... is ... declared to be a public use[.]' 19 The purpose of
Idaho's provision was to prevent any individual property owner
from blocking the expansion and development of the natural
resource industry in the state. 20 The provision was subject to
significant debate at the convention, where the mining dele-
gates argued such broad private condemnation authority was
necessary to guarantee Idaho's economic growth. Specifically,
proponents of the private takings clause contended that the
provision was "absolutely necessary, unless we want to leave
the whole domain of this ... state practically undeveloped" and
that "the very root of our prosperity in the future" depends on
this "most important matter. ' 21
On the other side, the non-mining delegates strongly op-
posed the grant of authority as "thievery," a "tool of monopo-
lists," and an authorization of the takings power for "any pur-
pose on God's green earth. '22  Ultimately, the economic
arguments carried the day and the mining interests won the
battle. As a result, the provision's supporters succeeded in de-
priving the state legislature and, to a large extent, the state ju-
diciary, of the power to declare what is and is not a public use
when it comes to eminent domain authority for natural re-
source development. 23 The example of Idaho illustrates that
constitutional delegates in Interior West states intended to rely
very heavily on natural resource development to create their
state economies and used the power of eminent domain to allo-
cate property rights accordingly. 24
In addition to constitutional provisions expressly authoriz-
ing natural resource development takings, state legislatures in
the Interior West enacted statutes delegating eminent domain
power to private industry to develop state natural resources.
19. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14.
20. DONALD CROWLEY & FLORENCE HEFFRON, THE IDAHO STATE
CONSTITUTION 8 (1994).
21. See 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF IDAHO, 1889, at 296-98 (I.W. Hart ed., 1912); see also Kent M. Brown, Note,
Cohen v. Larson: The Idaho Constitution and the Right of Eminent Domain, 31
IDAHO L. REV. 623, 633-34 (1995) (discussing proceedings at the Idaho Constitu-
tional Convention).
22. See GORDON M. BAKKEN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN CONSTITUTION MAKING 1850-
1912, at 30-32 (1987).
23. Id.
24. See KEITER & NEWCOMB, supra note 18, at 67 (discussing the importance
of natural resources development in Interior West states and how that importance
was reflected in state constitutions); Scheiber, supra note 17, at 244-45.
[Vol. 79
FRONTIER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Statutes in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming specifi-
cally grant eminent domain authority to private companies in
connection with mining, oil and gas, and other natural resource
development.25 These statutes differ significantly from the
numerous statutes across the country granting condemnation
authority to railroads, power companies, and other common
carriers. 26 In the latter cases, the railroad, power line, or other
common carrier project is destined for "use by the public," thus
meeting even the narrowest interpretation of public use. 2 7 By
contrast, the land condemned by an oil or mining company will
not be subject to public access or public use and is only "public"
in the sense that the resource development will add to the
growth of the overall state economy.
25. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1111(14) (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
38-2-104 (2007), 38-1-201(1)(a) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701(4) (2007); MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 70-30-102(31), (44) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010(5), (6) (2006);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-02(5), (10) (2006); OKLA. STAT 27, § 6 (2001); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5-1 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-1(5), (6) (2007); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-26-815 (2007).
26. See, e.g., 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §
7.05[3] [a] (3d ed. 2007) ("Courts in every state have ruled that railroads are cor-
porations that served the public and that eminent domain could be delegated to
them to acquire rail beds.").
27. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (discussing
railroad and common carrier cases as a familiar example of a private benefit that
meets the narrow definition of "use by the public" and distinguishing these cases
from the economic development case before the Court). The use of eminent do-
main for railroads, highways, and other transportation corridors is also independ-
ently justified by the "assembly" problem. Without eminent domain authority,
property owners would "hold up" the development and demand unreasonable
compensation because he or she knows the project cannot be assembled without
his or her parcel. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 781-82
(Mich. 2004) (holding that condemnation of private property by a railroad or other
transportation company is a public use because their existence depends on over-
coming assembly problems); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 170-75 (1985) (contending that
unlike a railroad or other common carrier, simply because a resource is locked in
place creating a "situational necessity" does not satisfy the demands of public use
"because it places no restraint upon the mining company's behavior and makes no
provision for" distributing surplus profits from the taking); Merrill & Smith, su-
pra note 4, at 1884 n.152 (noting that most opponents of economic development
takings make an exception for common carriers such as railroads or public utili-
ties because such entities provide services to the entire community, and benefits
are widely distributed and are often "subject to rate regulation, which limits the
gain they can obtain through the use of coerced property transactions"); Scheiber,
supra note 17, at 237 (stating that if railroad, bridge, and canal companies had
lacked the power of eminent domain "they would have been left at the mercy of
any individual landowner disposed to be stubborn or extortionate").
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Likewise, natural resource takings provisions differ sig-
nificantly from statutes in other states granting private parties
the right to condemn easements or rights-of-way of necessity to
facilitate ingress and egress of people or goods. 28 Instead, the
condemnation authority granted to natural resource develop-
ment companies in the Interior West included the power to
take lands not only for ingress and egress but for disposal of
wastewater, creation of reservoirs, and placement of buildings
and equipment necessary for the extraction of the natural re-
source.
29
28. Compare COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14 (granting broad condemnation author-
ity for reservoirs, drains, flumes, and ditches for agricultural, mining, and milling
purposes), with COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 7 (granting limited condemnation au-
thority by all persons or corporations for rights-of-way across public, private, and
corporate lands for conveyance of water for multiple purposes). See also OR.
CONST. art. I, § 18 (granting limited condemnation authority for use of roads,
ways, and waterways necessary to promote transportation of raw products of mine
or farm or forest or water for beneficial use); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (granting
limited condemnation power for private ways of necessity and for drains, flumes,
and ditches for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary purposes); Key v. Ellis, No.
2051020, 2007 WL 1378112 (Ala. Civ. App. May 11, 2007) (discussing state statu-
tory authorization for private owner of landlocked parcel to condemn right-of-way
over neighboring property); Cirelli v. Ent, 885 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(discussing statutory authorization for private party to condemn an easement by
necessity over neighboring property); Eversole v. Morgan Coal Co., 297 S.W.2d 51
(Ky. 1956) (affirming coal company authority to condemn right-of-way under state
statute to construct a truck road to transport goods to market); Kennedy v. Mar-
tin, 63 P.3d 866 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing statutory right of private party
to condemn private way of necessity over neighboring property); Foianini v. Brin-
ton, 855 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1993) (discussing statutory right for private party to
condemn ditch right-of-way over neighboring property); Scheiber, supra note 17,
at 245-46 (noting that while western courts could have relied on the fact that
mining is tied to a particular resource site to justify the need for eminent domain,
they relied instead on the argument that mining was a public benefit to the com-
munity, leaving the "more impressive" site necessity argument "in the back-
ground").
29. See, e.g., Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 88 P. 426 (1906) (holding that
the state constitution authorizes a private timber company to condemn twelve
acres of property to build a reservoir); MICHELE STRAUB & MELINDA HOLLAND, A
CONFLICT ASSESSMENT OF SPLIT ESTATES ISSUES AND A MODEL APPROACH TO
RESOLVING CONFLICTS OVER COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN THE POWDER
RIVER BASIN 7 (2003), available at http://www.ecr.gov/pdf/CAR.pdf (explaining
that coalbed methane companies have authority under state law to condemn pri-
vate lands for construction of roads, reservoirs, pumping stations, and other facili-
ties); Landowners Association of Wyoming, What You Can Expect,
http://www.wyominglandowners.org/issues/index.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2008)
(discussing ability of coalbed methane companies to use power of eminent domain
to take private hayfields and creek bottoms for discharge of wastewater); see also
supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional provisions).
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This broad authority given to private parties for natural
resource development takings illustrates the principle that
eminent domain, whether undertaken by the government or a
private party, is a method by which society reallocates land or
other resources to promote the public interest. 30 Whenever
eminent domain is authorized, it is a statement by a govern-
ment authority that it wishes to promote the public interest
through reallocation of property rights in a context where it
does not trust the market to reach an optimal result. 31 These
statutes and constitutional provisions in the Interior West exist
as a reflection of the desire of these states to use their property
laws to promote particular forms of economic growth without
interference from other private property interests.
B. Judicial Confirmation of Natural Resource
Development as a Public Use
The preceding section shows the wide authority state con-
stitutions and legislative enactments in the Interior West dele-
gated to natural resource development interests to encourage
these private interests to create economies for resource-rich
states. Once this power was granted, it was up to the courts to
determine how broadly to interpret these provisions when they
were challenged by landowners who did not want to give up
their land in the name of development. For the most part,
courts in the Interior West responded to public use challenges
with strong language upholding the right of private industry to
exercise the power of eminent domain as a "public use" without
the need for any oversight by local, county, or state political
bodies (as is needed for traditional economic development tak-
ings in other states). This precedent has resulted in the ab-
sence of meaningful judicial review of natural resource devel-
opment companies' contentions that the taking of private
property to support development of natural resources is for a
public use. It is this lack of meaningful judicial review, even
more than the ability of private parties to go directly to courts
30. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 583 (2007) ('The
power of eminent domain is essentially the power of government to reclaim land
or other resources for reallocation to a new use or user, public or private.").
31. Id. at 587, 605 (discussing whether to authorize private condemnations
under monopoly or other market failure conditions).
20081
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to condemn land, that necessitates the statutory or constitu-
tional reforms proposed in Part IV.
1. State Courts and Public Use on the "Frontier"
In the late nineteenth century, industry in the Interior
West made frequent use of its new power of eminent domain
for mining, milling, manufacturing, and other industrial devel-
opment. Not surprisingly, these efforts were met with opposi-
tion by neighbors who challenged the statutory and constitu-
tional authority of industry to exercise this power. Such
challenges had little success. In upholding the delegation of
eminent domain authority to private industry, state courts de-
scribed eloquently the role natural resource development by
private industry should play in the states' identity and prosper-
ity.32 As shown below, the courts used strong language to sup-
port the idea that private rights of eminent domain were criti-
cal to develop the states' natural resources and economy, that
such private development was a public use, and that these con-
demnation rights must prevail over any other private property
rights that might stand in the way.
For instance, in 1876 the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a
mining company's exercise of eminent domain authority to con-
demn a strip of private land. 33 The defendant argued that the
law authorizing the taking was unconstitutional because it al-
lowed the taking for a private use rather than a public use. 34
In reaching its decision, the court was forced to grapple with
whether the "public use" language in the takings clause of the
Nevada Constitution narrowly meant "possession, occupation
or direct enjoyment by the public" or whether it broadly meant
"any purpose of great public benefit, interest or advantage to
32. Most state supreme courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies analyzed state eminent domain laws solely under their state constitutions.
It is not clear from the decisions why the parties challenging the takings did not
also raise a challenge under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. It may be because the Supreme Court's jurisprudence was unclear
at that time whether the Fifth Amendment applied to the states, or whether liti-
gants believed the federal constitution would be less protective of individual prop-
erty rights than the state constitution. For a further discussion of the timing of
the Supreme Court's application of the Fifth Amendment to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra note 60.
33. Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876).
34. Id. at 398-99.
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the community. '' 35 The court first rejected the argument that
the mining company's power of eminent domain could fit within
the narrow view of public use. The court refused to find such
takings akin to the private power of eminent domain to build
roads, canals, railroads, or pipelines, as those latter takings
were for projects that were directly used or enjoyed by the pub-
lic. 36 Instead, the court reasoned that the statute granting the
right of eminent domain for mining purposes could be sus-
tained only if the court were to adopt the broad view of public
use.
37
The court adopted the broad view of public use and then
explained why mining met this standard. The court stated that
mining is the "greatest" of the industrial pursuits in the state
and that all other interests are "subservient to it."' 38 It de-
clared that "[o]ur mountains are almost barren of timber, and
our valley lands could never be made profitable for agricultural
purposes except for the fact of a home market having been cre-
ated by the mining developments in different sections of the
state."39 The court stated in quite stark terms that:
Nature has denied to this state many of the advantages
which other states possess; but by way of compensation to
her citizens has placed at their doors the richest and most
extensive silver deposits ever yet discovered. The present
prosperity of the state is entirely due to the mining devel-
opments already made, and the entire people of the state
are directly interested in having the future developments
unobstructed by the obstinate action of any individual or in-
dividuals. 40
This language clearly tied the state's prosperity to natural
resource development and broad authority for private industry.
Consequently, if the interests of industry conflicted with pri-
vate property rights, there was a clear winner in the name of
public use and public benefit. 4 1
35. Id. at 400.
36. Id. at 402.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 409.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 409-10.
41. See also Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker, 59 Ga. 419 (1877) (holding that
gold and silver mining company had authority to condemn private property be-
cause "[g]old and silver is the constitutional currency of the country," and produc-
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The Idaho Supreme Court reached a similar decision in a
1906 case where a lumber company sought to condemn land to
dam a river and store water for floating saw logs and other
timber products. 42 In upholding the company's condemnation
authority, the court recognized the existence of the narrow
view and the broad view of public use.43 The court adopted the
broad view on the theory that the framers of the state constitu-
tion "understood that a complete development of the material
resources of our young state could not be made unless the
power of eminent domain was made broader than it was in
many of the Constitutions of the several states of the Union. '44
To hold otherwise would be "to defeat the development of the
great natural advantages, resources and industrial opportuni-
ties" in Idaho and other states. 45 Specifically with regard to
Idaho, the court focused on "the contour of the country, its
mountain fastnesses," the arid condition of the state, and "the
great difficulty of preparing and constructing means and modes
of communication and transportation. ' 46 It was thus a "neces-
sity" to enlarge and broaden the power of eminent domain in
the state constitution. 47
These judicial sentiments have continued through more re-
cent years. In 1979, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the
authority of an oil company to condemn private property to
provide access for exploration and development of oil and gas
leases. 48 The issue was whether a state statute granting emi-
nent domain authority to companies engaged in "mining" also
encompassed oil and gas exploration. The court interpreted the
statute broadly because the Wyoming Constitution expressly
provides that private property can be taken for private devel-
opment of mining and related purposes so long as just compen-
sation is paid. 49 The court found it "plain beyond any doubt"
that the purpose of the statute and the constitution "was to fa-
tion of such currency is "of vital importance to the permanent welfare and pros-
perity of the people of the state of Georgia, as well as the people of the United
States").
42. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 88 P. 426 (Idaho 1906).
43. Id. at 431.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406 (Wyo. 1979).
49. Id. at 408 (citing WYO. CONST. art. I, § 32).
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cilitate the development of our state's resources."50 The court
went on to cite not only the needs of the state at the time of its
founding, but also the "great public interest in an imminent
need for energy." 51 The court noted that when the constitution
was adopted "the concern was one of developing the economy
and settlement of the state" but in 1979, "the urgency has now
become one of survival. ' 52 More recent Wyoming Supreme
Court decisions from 2002 and 2005 show continuing judicial
approval of private takings for energy and other natural re-
source development. 53 In these cases, once it is established
that the use of eminent domain is authorized by the state con-
stitution, the court's review of public use is over.54
Likewise, in 1987, the Montana Supreme Court held that a
mining company could condemn the surface rights held by an-
other mining company because the development of the mineral
interest was a "public use" and was "more necessary" than the
rights of the surface owner. 55 The court interpreted the statute
broadly in favor of eminent domain authority for development
of natural resources. 56 The court declared that from the begin-
ning it has been the policy of the state "to foster and encourage
the development of the state's mineral resources in every rea-
50. Id. at 411.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 118 P.3d 996, 1014
(Wyo. 2005) (upholding condemnation of private power line to service coalbed
methane development in the area as consistent with public interest and necessity
to "permit mineral estate owners to realize the full benefit of their property own-
ership" (quoting Wyo. Res. Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 49 P.3d 999, 1004 (Wyo.
2002))); Wyo. Res. Corp., 49 P.3d at 1003-04 (holding it is a public use under state
eminent domain laws for oil and gas company to condemn access easement to
reach coalbed methane wells and that the laws were established "to permit min-
eral owners to realize the full benefit of their property ownership" and so "land-
locked property will not be rendered useless").
54. See, e.g., Bridle Bit Ranch Co., 118 P.3d at 1013-14 (applying a "broad
meaning" to public use and public necessity and giving great deference to private
party condemnation "by virtue of the delegation of the power of eminent domain
by the state to the condemnor" (quoting 1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §
4.11[2], 4-191 to 4-194 (3d ed. 1998))); Wyo. Res. Corp., 49 P.3d at 1001-02 (stat-
ing that the Wyoming Constitution sets forth private uses that are deemed to in-
directly benefit the general public and thus such a private use "is by constitu-
tional edict given the force and effect of a public use" (quoting Coronado Oil Co.,
603 P.2d at 410)).
55. Mont. Talc Co. v. Cyprus Mines Corp., 748 P.2d 444 (Mont. 1987).
56. Id. at 447-48.
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sonable way." 57 The court found this authority justified "be-
cause the mineral wealth of this Treasure State, so named for
its huge store of minerals taken and yet to be taken, is a prime
springhead of past and future economic increase for Montan-
ans."58 Thus, in present day Montana, as in Wyoming, once a
private taking is found to be within a broadly-defined statutory
or constitutional public use, there is little further role for a
court in reviewing whether the exercise of the taking power is
in fact in the interests of the public.59
These decisions show both the weight placed on natural re-
source development during a time period when many western
states were seen as barren wastelands barely fit for human
habitation, and the continuing importance of natural resource
development in the region. State legislatures and courts em-
braced the idea that the survival of these states depended on
giving free rein to private industry to develop state resources
for both public and private good. From a very early time in the
Interior West, private natural resource development took on
the mantle of public use, public benefit, and public good. It is
thus not surprising that courts in these states were quick to
find natural resource development takings were a public use
for purposes of eminent domain authority. Moreover, these
cases show that the courts provided limited review of private
condemning authorities' statements that takings were for a
public use. The courts recognized no ability to balance the
purported needs of the private condemning authorities against
any countervailing economic, land use, or social concern. In-
deed, the seemingly straightforward nature in which these
cases were decided reveals the lack of any significant authority
by the courts under state law to consider any countervailing in-
terests in making the determination of public use.
57. Id. at 449 (quoting Kip v. Davis-Daly Copper Co, 110 P. 237, 241 (Mont.
1910)).
58. Id. at 448. But see McCabe Petroleum Corp. v. Easement & Right-of-Way,
87 P.3d 479, 481-83 (Mont. 2004) (distinguishing Montana Talc and holding
power of eminent domain for "mining" does not encompass exploration for oil and
gas wells; plaintiff company could not condemn easement and right-of-way over
ranch to allow it to drill and operate oil wells).
59. See Mont. Talc Co., 748 P.2d at 447-48 (rejecting the argument that the
statutorily-enumerated public uses should be strictly construed and stating that
"the legislature has given to mining concerns the awesome power to condemn pri-
vate property for public use in return for just compensation").
[Vol. 79
FRONTIER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
2. Supreme Court Deference to State Public Use
Determinations
By the end of the nineteenth century, the federal courts
had begun conducting federal constitutional reviews of state
takings cases. 60 As a result, challenges to state delegation to
private entities of the power to effect natural resource devel-
opment takings and other economic development takings be-
came a matter of federal constitutional law in addition to state
constitutional law. In the decisions that resulted from these
challenges, the Supreme Court adopted the broad view of pub-
lic use. In doing so, it gave great deference to state legislative
delegations of eminent domain authority to private actors
where such delegations would promote mining, milling, irriga-
tion, and other industrial development critical to grow the
states' economies and, in particular, the western frontier. 61 As
a result, the Court validated-as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law-the broad view of public use that western state
courts had so eloquently created as a matter of state constitu-
tional law. Equally as important, the Court's deference was
based in large part on the recognition that different states had
different economic needs based on their population, natural re-
sources, and other economic drivers.
The Court's first cases authorizing broad eminent domain
authority for private industry involved various state "Mill Acts"
and other private irrigation projects which had been authorized
by statute as early as the late colonial era.62 In 1885, the
Court upheld New Hampshire's Mill Act, which authorized any
person to maintain a watermill and milldam upon a stream
60. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (stating
that the Supreme Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States "at
the close of the 19th century"); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1132
(Ohio 2006) (same). But see Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158
(1896) (stating that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the States and "ap-
plies only to the federal government"); Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power
Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings "Muddle," 90
MINN. L. REV. 826 (2006) (arguing it was not until Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), that the Court applied the Fifth
Amendment taking clause directly to the states and that earlier Supreme Court
takings cases reviewing state condemnations were actually doing so on Four-
teenth Amendment due process grounds).
61. City of Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1132-33; Nichols, supra note 9, at 623.
62. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511-12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (recognizing that
many states had Mill Acts at the time of the nation's founding).
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and pay the owners of nearby flooded land just compensation. 63
The Court held that the purpose of these laws was to improve
the water power of rivers for manufacturing and mechanical
purposes, and that it would defer to the various state legisla-
tures to determine whether such laws were for a public use.
64
Likewise, in 1905, in Clark v. Nash,65 the Court upheld a
Utah statute that allowed a private landowner to condemn an
irrigation ditch across his neighbor's land for private irrigation
purposes. The court rejected the defendant's argument that
the condemnation was not for a public use because the purpose
of the condemnation was to irrigate only the plaintiffs land
with no common or public right to use the water. 66 The Court
reasoned that the validity of the Utah statute must be deter-
mined based on the specific conditions in that state, including
"the difference of climate and soil, which render necessary
these different laws in the states so situated. ' 67 Because the
local courts were more familiar with the specific state condi-
tions, the Court would defer to the public use determinations of
the state courts and legislatures. 68
The Court quickly applied this broad reading of public use
to mining and other natural resource development takings on
the American frontier. In 1906, in Strickley v. Highland Boy
Gold Mining Company,69 Justice Holmes upheld a Utah stat-
ute that allowed a mining company to condemn a right-of-way
across private property for an aerial bucket line. Once again,
the Court deferred to the state determination of public use.
The Court noted that the state legislature and state supreme
court had determined that "the public welfare of that state de-
mands that aerial lines between the mines upon its mountain
sides and the railways in the valleys below" should not be frus-
trated by a private owner's refusal to sell the right to cross his
land.70 As to the Court's role in reviewing that determination,
Justice Holmes declared "[t]he Constitution of the United
States does not require us to say that they are wrong."
71
63. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
64. Id. at 19-21.
65. 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
66. Id. at 367-68.
67. Id. at 369-70.
68. Id.
69. 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
70. Id. at 531.
71. Id.
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These Supreme Court decisions at the dawn of the twenti-
eth century show the significant deference the Court gave to
state legislatures to delegate the power of eminent domain to
private industry to develop state resources and economies. The
Court was fairly explicit in its opinions that this deference was
based in large part on the different economic and resource con-
ditions in each state, which argued against imposing a uniform
public use rule to be applied nationwide. The next Part shows
that there is a direct line from these early natural resource de-
velopment cases to the current Supreme Court view that tak-
ings for economic development purposes can be a public use
consistent with the Fifth Amendment.
II. KELO AND NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS
Prior to Kelo v. City of New London,72 what constituted a
public use under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was
far from a "hot topic." The Court had decided only two public
use cases in the past forty years: Berman v. Parker,73 in 1954,
and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,74 in 1984. Although
the Court had decided several cases earlier in the twentieth
century, 75 none reached the level of flagship cases in constitu-
tional law or property law. Indeed, in 1940, one commentator
stated almost apologetically that the issue of public use was an
important part of the law of eminent domain even though the
issue "has never figured in the constitutional cases which have
aroused passionate controversy, nor in those whose names are
known to the lay public .... -76 Times have changed.
In 2005, after a more than 20-year hiatus, the Court once
again took up the issue of what constitutes a "public use" suffi-
cient to allow a taking of private property with payment of just
compensation. In Kelo, the Court reviewed the City of New
London's plan to redevelop its waterfront area "to increase tax
and other revenues and to revitalize an economically distressed
city."' 77 An important part of the redevelopment plan included
a proposed $300 million research facility for the pharmaceuti-
72. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
73. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
74. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
75. See, e.g., supra Section I.B.2.
76. Nichols, supra note 9, at 615.
77. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
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cal company Pfizer. New London planners hoped the creation
of a new corporate headquarters in the area would draw new
business, create jobs, and provide "a catalyst to the area's reju-
venation."78  New London was unable to negotiate purchase
agreements with all the petitioner home owners in the devel-
opment area, so it proceeded to use its statutory authority to
initiate condemnation proceedings against them. 79
The Court reviewed the case to determine "whether a
City's decision to take property for the purpose of economic de-
velopment satisfies the 'public use' requirement of the Fifth
Amendment. °80 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that New
London's use of eminent domain for economic development
purposes was in fact a public use and was constitutional.8 1
Numerous courts and scholars have analyzed the Kelo decision
and the issue of economic development takings since the time
the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.8 2 The scholarship
78. Id. at 473.
79. Id. at 475.
80. Id. at 477.
81. Seeid. at 484.
82. See, e.g., City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1142 (Ohio 2006)
(discussing Kelo and holding that economic benefit alone does not constitute a
public use under the Ohio Constitution); Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d
639, 651 (Okla. 2006) (discussing Kelo and holding that state constitution places
more stringent limitations on governmental eminent domain power than the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About
Nothing: Kelo v. City of New London, Babbitt v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales
from the Supreme Court, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 663 (2006); David A. Dana, The Law
and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after Kelo, 101 Nw. U. L. REV.
365 (2006); Timothy Dowling, How to Think about Kelo after the Shouting Stops,
38 URB. LAw. 191 (2006); Robert Dreher & John D. Echeverria, Kelo's Unan-
swered Questions: The Policy Debate Over the Use of Eminent Domain for Eco-
nomic Development, Georgetown Envtl. Law & Policy Inst. Report, at 11, 14
(2006), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/currentresearch/
documents/GELPIReportKelo.pdf; Richard Epstein, Kelo: An American Origi-
nal, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 355 (2005); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain
Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957 (2004); Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Re-
quirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and
Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2006); Douglas W. Kmiec, Eminent Do-
main Post-Kelo, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 501 (2007); Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht,
Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704 (2007); Alberto B. Lopez, Weigh-
ing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 237 (2006); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Po-
litical Response to Kelo, George Mason University Law and Economics Research
Paper Series, SSRN Id. 976298 (Jan. 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=976298; Laura S. Underkuffler, Kelo's Moral Failure,
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 377 (2006); Amanda W. Goodin, Note, Rejecting the
Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State Legislation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 177 (2007).
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in this area has focused primarily on the implications of the
case for economic development takings generally, the state
statutory reform it has spawned, and whether there are other
approaches to eminent domain that can be used to address the
"fairness" problem that arises when private property is taken
from one party and given to another in the name of economic
development.83
The treatment of Kelo here, by contrast, looks at how the
case builds on natural resource development takings cases to
reach its decision. In Kelo, Justice Stevens began by explaining
that the Court had long approved the transfer of property from
one private party to another even where the property will not
be put into "use by the public."8 4 In support of that proposi-
tion, Justice Stevens cited and discussed in detail Strickley v.
Highland Boy Gold Mining Company8 5 (mining company con-
demnation of property for an aerial bucket line), Dayton Gold
& Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell86 (mining company condemna-
tion for a road), and the Mill Act cases (allowing private parties
to flood upstream land to create dams and power for manufac-
turing). 87
After considering the Court's most recent public use au-
thority (i.e., Berman v. Parker88 and Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff8 9), Justice Stevens returned to the natural resource
development cases. 90 He refused to adopt a bright-line rule re-
jecting economic development as a public use or even to apply
heightened scrutiny to such takings. 91 Instead, he declared
that "[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and
long accepted function of government" and that there is no way
to distinguish economic development takings "from the other
public purposes that we have recognized. ' 92 The other public
purposes to which Justice Stevens referred, of course, related to
natural resource development. The Court, in upholding such
83. See, e.g., articles cited supra note 82.
84. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.
85. 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906).
86. 11 Nev. 394, 1876 WL 4573, *11 (Nev. Oct. 1876).
87. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479-80 nn.7-8.
88. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
89. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
90. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
91. See id. at 482-484.
92. Id. at 484.
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takings, "emphasized the importance of those industries to the
welfare of the States in question."93
Based on this authority, the Court declined to "second-
guess" the City's judgment about the efficacy of its redevelop-
ment plan and its determination of public need. 94 Such defer-
ence draws on the Court's decisions from one hundred years
ago that granted the same deference to local decision-makers
with regard to the best way to develop state resources to pro-
mote the state's economy. 95 Consistent with this focus on local
determination of local needs, the Court "emphasized" that
nothing in the opinion precluded any state from "placing fur-
ther restrictions on its exercise of the takings power" and that
many states had already done so through their own statutory
or constitutional law. 96
The Kelo decision included a concurrence and two separate
dissents. 97 The dissents focused on the sanctity and security of
private property as well as the potential for abuse of the tak-
ings power by local officials seeking to "upgrade" property in
their jurisdictions. Justice O'Connor's dissent in particular
warned that the "specter of condemnation" looms large over all
private property: "Nothing is to prevent the State from replac-
ing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping
mall, or any farm with a factory." 98
Justice O'Connor did not cite the natural resource devel-
opment takings cases in her dissent but Justice Thomas did in
his. In tracking the Court's public use decisions from the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he focused on when
and how the Court had shifted from a "use by the public" defi-
nition of "public use" to the current, broader standard of "public
purpose." 99 In his view, the irrigation and Mill Act cases came
93. Id.
94. Id. at 488-89.
95. Id. at 482-83, 483 n.11 ("[O]ur jurisprudence has recognized that the
needs of society have varied between different parts of the Nation, just as they
have evolved over time in response to changed circumstances." (citing, e.g.,
Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908) (public use determi-
nation for rail spur); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527,
531 (1906) (allowing mining company to condemn private property for aerial lines
between mines))).
96. Id. at 489.
97. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 494 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 512-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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within the true definition of "public use" because the public had
a right to use the water these projects produced. 100 Many of
these irrigation and Mill Act decisions, however, used the "pub-
lic purpose" language in dicta and that language was picked up
in the subsequent Court decisions involving mining company
condemnations that Justice Stevens relied upon in his majority
opinion.101 According to Justice Thomas, the Court's cases
then "quickly incorporated" the public purpose standard set
forth in the mining cases "by barren citation."'102 Under this
view of the precedent, the broad "public purpose" test that sup-
ported the economic development takings allowed in Kelo rests
on a line of natural resource development takings cases that
strayed from the true meaning of "public use." 103
The public, legislative, and judicial reaction to Kelo was
significant and swift. Throughout the country, the public, state
legislatures, and state courts were quick to take up Justice
Stevens' invitation to narrow what constitutes a public use as a
matter of state law. The Supreme Courts of Oklahoma and
Ohio each rejected the broad view of eminent domain expressed
in Kelo and held that economic development alone was not a
public use or public purpose justifying the exercise of eminent
domain as a matter of state constitutional law. 104 More impor-
tant, the Kelo decision led to a flood of new state legislation and
constitutional amendments to limit economic development tak-
ings and otherwise place limits on the power of eminent do-
main. 105 The focus of much of this legislation, not surprisingly,
100. Id.
101. Id. at 515-16 (citing Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S.
527 (1906); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905)).
102. Id. at 516-17.
103. See id. at 515-17.
104. See Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 651-52 (Okla. 2006); City
of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1140-41 (Ohio 2006). Just prior to Kelo,
the Michigan Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion. See County of Wayne
v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786-88 (Mich. 2004). These recent decisions follow
earlier rulings in Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, South Carolina, and Maine inter-
preting their state constitutions to hold that economic development alone is not a
public use. See Muskogee County, 136 P.3d at 651 n.20 (collecting cases).
105. See Somin, supra note 82, at 14-35 (summarizing state legislation
throughout the country but arguing that most of the newly enacted laws will re-
sult in few meaningful restrictions on economic development takings); CASTLE
COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD: EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM LEGISLATION
SINCE KELO (2007), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/reportcard/
50_StateReport.pdf (summarizing eminent domain reform in the states since
Kelo) [hereinafter 50 STATE REPORT CARD]. The National Conference of State
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was placing limits on economic development takings by outlaw-
ing them completely, narrowing the definition of what consti-
tutes "blight," or placing other related restrictions on state and
local governments. As of August 2007, forty-two states had en-
acted post-Kelo reforms, some of which limited significantly the
ability of state or local governments to engage in the type of
economic development takings the Court found constitutional
in Kelo. 106
These legislative reforms have been helped by the efforts of
the Institute for Justice and the Castle Coalition. The Institute
for Justice is a libertarian public interest law firm that repre-
sented the property owners in Kelo and represents landowners
in economic development takings across the country. 10 7 The
Castle Coalition is an organization formed by the Institute for
Justice that provides a central bank of information and helps
support grassroots activism to oppose government takings and
reform state eminent domain laws. 108 These interests groups,
as well as most state legislatures that have engaged in eminent
domain reform, have focused almost exclusively on limiting
Kelo-type economic development takings by government enti-
ties and portraying such eminent domain actions as the taking
of private property for "private use" or "private gain." Such
groups make virtually no mention of the fact that natural re-
source development takings exist at all. Indeed, many people
(including law professors and lawyers outside the Interior
West) are surprised to hear that in many states, natural re-
source companies have the direct right of eminent domain to
facilitate natural resource development for private economic
gain.
For example, in an Institute for Justice Report on economic
development takings, the author states that Wyoming had no
Legislatures website also tracks eminent domain reform legislation throughout
the country. See National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org
programs/natres/emindomain.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
106. See, e.g., Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com-content&task--view&id=57
(last visited May 6, 2008) (noting that as of 2007, forty-two states had passed new
eminent domain reform laws since the Kelo decision); National Conference of
State Legislatures, supra note 105 (summarizing state legislation enacted from
2005-2007); see also 50 STATE REPORT CARD, supra note 105.
107. See Somin, supra note 82, at 13; Institute for Justice: Litigating for Lib-
erty, http://www.ij.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
108. See Castle Coalition, About Us, http://www.castlecoalition.org/profile/
index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
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reported instances of eminent domain for private development
other than takings by railroads, oil and gas companies, and
coal companies to condemn private property for mineral ac-
cess.10 9 The report concludes that none of these takings in-
volved "the type of private eminent domain abuse so common in
most of the rest of the country" and that Wyoming landowners
are "safe" from economic development takings. 110 While Wyo-
ming landowners may not be exposed to government-initiated
economic development takings, Wyoming law encourages and
facilitates takings by oil and gas companies to aid the efficient
extraction of natural resources. 11
Moreover, recent efforts in many states to limit the gov-
ernment's power of eminent domain have resulted in legisla-
tion and constitutional amendments that carefully leave intact
the power of private entities to exercise the power of eminent
domain. For instance, efforts to limit eminent domain in Idaho
(both through successful legislative action and a failed ballot
initiative) retained in full eminent domain authority for roads,
tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places for tailings
and other refuse associated with mining activity. 112 Even more
fundamentally, federal law and the law in many states ex-
pressly delegates the power of eminent domain to power com-
panies and oil and gas companies for the construction of elec-
tric transmission lines and oil and gas pipelines. 113  This
109. See DANA BERLINER, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE
GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 217 (Apr. 2003).
110. Id. To its credit, the more recent Castle Coalition report on eminent do-
main reform does at least raise concerns regarding the existence of private tak-
ings in Idaho and Wyoming. See 50 STATE REPORT CARD, supra note 105, at 16,
54.
111. See supra notes 18, 25, 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing author-
ity for natural resource development takings in Wyoming contained in the state
constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions).
112. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701(a) (2006); 50 STATE REPORT CARD, su-
pra note 105, at 16 (noting that Idaho Proposition 2 on eminent domain failed to
pass in November 2006); JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW &
POLICY INST., ALL OVER THE MAP: THE DIVERSITY OF 2006 STATE BALLOT
MEASURES ADDRESSING EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 4-5
(2007).
113. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a), (e)(1) (Supp. V 2005) (creating private right
of eminent domain for electronic transmission facility pursuant to federally-
authorized construction permit in a designated "national interest electric trans-
mission corridor"); 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2000) (creating private right of eminent
domain to construct and operate natural gas pipeline where government has
granted pipeline operator a "certificate of public convenience and necessity"); East
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eminent domain authority granted directly to private industry
is rarely, if ever, questioned as part of the recent initiatives to
rethink the concept of "public use." 114
By focusing only on government takings and ignoring pri-
vate takings, legislators and interest groups have improperly
framed the issue as one solely of government abuse of eminent
domain authority. Instead, eminent domain is only one legal
mechanism by which society allocates property rights to meet
the needs of the public.115 Such allocations should change as
times and circumstances change. As a result, it is perfectly ap-
propriate for states to expand or contract the power of eminent
domain, or to create additional procedural rights or compensa-
tion rights for parties subject to condemnation actions. In do-
ing so, however, it is shortsighted to ignore private takings for
natural resource development in states where such condemna-
tions are prevalent and to treat the issue as one that is a rela-
tionship only between local governments wielding too much
power and vulnerable private property owners. Instead, emi-
nent domain is often a tool used by private industry to promote
private interests at the expense of other private parties with no
state or local government involvement in the eminent domain
proceeding. Thus, Part III considers the nature of eminent
domain reform in the Interior West and shows that the Kelo
backlash in some of these states has not focused exclusively on
prohibiting or significantly limiting economic development tak-
ings, but instead has attempted broader reforms that also en-
compass natural resource development takings.
III. TRANSITIONS IN NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER
A review of eminent domain and property rights reform in
the Interior West reveals that while there has not been a fron-
Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 822-23 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing
process by which natural gas company obtains a certificate of public convenience
and necessity under the Natural Gas Act and acquires rights of eminent domain
pursuant to that certificate); Jim Behnke & Harold Dondis, The Sage Approach to
Immediate Entry by Private Entities Exercising Federal Eminent Domain Author-
ity Under the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power Act, 27 ENERGY L.J. 499,
501-07 (2006) (discussing sources of statutory authority for eminent domain by
private parties).
114. See ECHEVERRIA, supra note 112.
115. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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tal attack on natural resource development takings, subtle re-
forms have in fact taken place. These reforms can be seen as
part of a broader reconsideration of the role of natural resource
development in the Interior West, as these states attempt to
balance economic development, urban expansion, traditional
natural resource development, and preservation of the envi-
ronment. In adopting recent reforms, state legislatures and
courts are readjusting the allocation of property rights in favor
of individual property owners to address the present-day needs
of their states, just as they adjusted them in favor of natural
resource extraction companies to promote that industry over
100 years ago. 116
This Part explores the continuing economic and identity-
shaping role of natural resource development on the "Frontier."
It then focuses on judicial and legislative property reforms
within the Interior West that in part flow from Kelo but in
some cases are more tailored to the issues and needs of the In-
terior West. As proposed below, however, states should go fur-
ther and consider reforms that address directly the per se pub-
lic use designation for natural resource development.
A. The Role of Natural Resources in the Identity of the
New West
Historians have long struggled with the term "Frontier"
and how to define it. Fredrick Jackson Turner described the
Frontier as "the process of evolution in each western area
reached in the process of expansion" and "the meeting point be-
tween savagery and civilization." 117 Modern-day historians,
many of whom have rejected Turner's approach, continue to
struggle with a term that "has become a metaphor for promise,
progress and ingenuity" but continues to elude precise defini-
tion.118 When Turner delivered his famous 1893 essay, The
116. See, e.g., Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906)
(deferring to state determination that public welfare requires eminent domain
power to promote mineral development); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 370 (1905)
("This court must recognize the difference of climate and soil, which render neces-
sary these different laws in the states so situated.").
117. FREDRICK JACKSON TURNER, The Significance of the Frontier in American
History, in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1, 2-3 (1920).
118. See DAVID M. WROBEL, THE END OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM:
FRONTIER ANXIETY FROM THE OLD WEST TO THE NEW DEAL 145 (1993); see also
Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Adventures of the Frontier in the Twentieth Cen-
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Significance of the Frontier in American History, he declared
that, as of that date, the American Frontier had "closed." 119 As
Patricia Nelson Limerick and others have argued, however, if
one accepts the idea that the Frontier closed in the 1890s, one
misses the important economic and cultural developments that
have created and continue to create western identities since the
beginning of the twentieth century.120 These "frontier" devel-
opments include copper, coal, petroleum, moviemaking, skiing,
defense spending, fishing, and tourism. 121 This section dis-
cusses the importance of the natural resource extraction indus-
try in shaping those states that make up the Interior West and
its continuing role today.
The Interior West has always served a distinctive regional
role that includes its "long-term involvement with the
boom/bust economies of extractive industries" as well as "the
commercial, intentional mythologizing of the West as a place of
romantic escape and adventure." 122 Its "dramatic and distinc-
tive landscapes" along with its dependence on a natural re-
source economy have resulted in an identity tied more closely
to physical land and natural resource development than in
other parts of the country. 123
Natural resource development remains an important eco-
nomic driver in many states in the region. For example, Wyo-
ming mines produce over twenty-seven million tons of coal per
year and the state is home to the ten largest coal mines in the
tury, in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN CULTURE 67, 67-80 (James R. Grossman ed.,
1994) (describing historians' perpetual struggle with the idea of the "frontier").
119. See TURNER, supra note 117, at 1, 38 ("And now, four centuries from the
discovery of America, at the end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution,
the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American
history.").
120. See Limerick, supra note 118, at 75; see also ROBERT V. HINE & JOHN
MACK FARAGHER, THE AMERICAN WEST: A NEW INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 494
(2000) (discussing problems with Turner's notion of a "closed frontier," noting that
more land west of the Mississippi was taken up in the years after 1890 than be-
fore, and that "[a] century later, the West has yet to fill up."); PATRICIA NELSON
LIMERICK, SOMETHING IN THE SOIL: LEGACIES AND RECKONINGS IN THE NEW
WEST 19 (2000) [hereinafter LIMERICK, SOMETHING IN THE SOIL] ("A number of
extractive industries-timber, oil, coal, and uranium-went through their princi-
pal booms and busts after 1890. If one went solely by the numbers, the nine-
teenth-century westward movement was the tiny, quiet prelude to the much more
sizable movement of people into the West in the twentieth century.").
121. HINE & FARAGHER, supra note 120, at 555; Limerick, supra note 118, at
75.
122. See LIMERICK, SOMETHING IN THE SOIL, supra note 120, at 25.
123. See id. at 102-03.
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United States. 124 In recent years, Wyoming has also benefited
economically from the development of coalbed methane as an
energy source, resulting in over $257 million in tax and royalty
income to the state and its counties in 2003.125 Indeed, over
fifty percent of all tax revenues in Wyoming come from the
mineral and energy industries, with tourism at fourteen per-
cent and agriculture at two percent. 126 Other states in the re-
gion also rely on natural resources-New Mexico is the second-
largest producer of crude oil in the West, followed by Wyoming,
Colorado, Montana and Utah. 127 The Intermountain West is
also home to over forty percent of the potential natural gas re-
serves in the country, and produces nearly twenty percent of
the nation's natural gas. 128
Unlike the early 1900s, however, energy is not the only
booming industry in town. Rather, recreation, tourism, fishing,
and hunting now represent major economic drivers in the Inte-
rior West. In Montana, for instance, nonresident travel in-
creased thirty percent from 1991 to 2002, topping 9.8 million
travelers, more than ten times Montana's resident popula-
tion. 129 In 2003, visitors to Montana spent $1.86 billion, and
created a total economic impact of $2.75 billion. 130 Indeed,
hunting, angling, and related industries alone added $3 billion
in 2001 to the combined economies of Arizona, Idaho, New
Mexico, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. 13 1 Unlike Wyoming,
124. See PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK ET AL., CTR. OF THE AM. WEST, WHAT
EVERY WESTERNER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ENERGY 10 (2003) [hereinafter
LIMERICK ET AL., WHAT EVERY WESTERNER SHOULD KNOW].
125. See RUCKELSHAUS INST. OF ENV'T AND NATURAL RES., WATER
PRODUCTION FROM COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN WYOMING: A SUMMARY
OF QUANTITY, QUALITY AND MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 8-9 (2005),
http://www.uwyo.edu/enr/ienr/CBMWaterFinalReportDec2005.pdf.
126. See PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK ET AL., CTR. OF THE AM. WEST, BOOM AND
BUST IN THE AMERICAN WEST 4 (2002), http://www.centerwest.org/publications/
pdffboombust.pdf. The oil and gas industry as a whole paid Wyoming government
entities about $1.5 billion in total taxes, royalties, and lease payments. Payments
to New Mexico totaled $1.8 billion. See Ray Ring, Gold from the Gas Fields, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 28, 2005, at 8, 9, 11.
127. LIMERICK ET AL., WHAT EVERY WESTERNER SHOULD KNOW, supra note
124, at 10.
128. Id. at 11.
129. Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Montana Tourism and the Role of Fish
and Wildlife, http://fwp.mt.gov/tmc/reports/tourism.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2008).
130. Id.
131. SONORAN INST., YOU'VE COME A LONG WAY, COWBOY: TEN TRUTHS &
TRENDS IN THE NEW AMERICAN WEST 6 (2006), http://sonoran.org/index.php?
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where natural resources and mining continued to employ
nearly ten percent of the population in 2005,132 extraction in-
dustries employed between only one and five percent of the
population in Montana, 133 Colorado, 134 and New Mexico. 135
Thus, many parts of the region have undergone an eco-
nomic and cultural transition from what was once an extractive
economy to one now based heavily on preservation, recreation,
services, and trade. As economists Thomas Power and Richard
Barrett have stated, "[h]owever large the natural resources in-
dustries may still loom in the American imagination as sym-
bols of the Old West, in the economy of the New West their
economic stature has been sharply diminished." 136 As a result,
there exists a "Western Paradox" in the region that consists of
an intense belief in the industry, technology, and extractive
economy of the past along with a similarly intense devotion to
nature, open space, solitude, and preservation. 137
Recent legislative developments in allocating property
rights show a trend toward reassessing the role of natural re-
source development in these states and a new focus on balanc-
ing surface use and mineral extraction. Such reforms show the
law "catching up," albeit in subtle ways, with the economic and
cultural changes that have been taking place in the West for
decades. The public reaction to Kelo is national in scope. Nev-
ertheless, it has brought about certain reforms in the Interior
West that are tailored to the economics and culture of the re-
gion. In this way, the law of eminent domain continues to be
sensitive to "the difference of climate and soil, which render
option=com -content&task--view&id=155&Itemid=204 (follow "Download PDF'
hyperlink).
132. HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, A SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE: WYOMING 32
(2007), http://www.headwaterseconomics.org/profiles/p-Wyoming.pdf.
133. HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, A SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE: MONTANA 32
(2007), http://www.headwaterseconomics.org/profiles/pMontana.pdf.
134. HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, A SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE: COLORADO 32
(2007), http://www.headwaterseconomics.org/profiles/p-Colorado.pdf.
135. HEADWATERS ECONOMICS: A SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE: NEW MEXICO 32
(2007), http://www.headwaterseconomics.org/profiles/p-NewMexico.pdf.
136. THOMAS MICHAEL POWER & RICHARD N. BARRETT, POST-COWBOY
ECONOMICS 55 (2001); see also WILLIAM R. TRAVIS, NEW GEOGRAPHIES OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 3 (2007) (stating that for some time now, the development occur-
ring in the Interior West "has had little to do with natural resource extraction"
and instead is based more on information technology, light manufacturing, tour-
ism, and retirement).
137. See DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES: NATURE AND HISTORY IN
THE AMERICAN WEST 82-92 (1992).
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necessary these different laws in the States so situated. '' 138
The following sections explore recent reforms and consider
their broader implications for the role of eminent domain in so-
ciety.
B. Eminent Domain Reform on the Frontier
This section looks at recent statutory reforms in states
that grant eminent domain authority to private entities for
natural resource development to determine if the reforms focus
solely on economic development takings by state and local gov-
ernments or also address natural resource development tak-
ings. Although these states share a common history, they have
followed very different social and economic paths in recent
years and thus now face different land use, economic, and re-
source challenges.
For instance, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada
had the largest percentage population growth in the country
between 1990 and 2000, bringing with it significant urban de-
velopment. 139 In other states in the Interior West such as
Wyoming, however, population growth and urban development
have been much more modest, natural resources development
remains a significant part of the economy, and, not surpris-
ingly, Kelo-type economic development takings are rare to non-
existent. 140 Appropriately then, Wyoming's 2007 eminent do-
main reform appears to be tied to growing tensions in the state
between mineral development companies and surface owners,
rather than between local governments and homeowners. In
138. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 370 (1905).
139. See CensusScope, States Ranked by Population Growth 1990-2000,
http://www.censusscope.org/us/rank-popl-growth.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2008)
(showing Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, and Idaho ranked 1-5 in percentage
population growth from 1990-2000 and growth rates ranging from 28.53% to
66.27%).
140. See Somin, supra note 82, at 13 (showing no "private-to-private condem-
nations" from 1998-2002 in Idaho, South Dakota, or Wyoming, and only one such
taking in North Dakota); CensusScope, supra note 139 (showing Wyoming, South
Dakota and North Dakota in the bottom tier of states in terms of population
growth from 1990-2000). It should be noted, however, the numbers from the
Somin article were based on an Institute for Justice Study, which did not break
out economic development takings from other "private-to-private" condemnations
and also did not appear to include takings for natural resource development pur-
poses. See Somin, supra note 82, at 12-15 (explaining data limitations of study).
See generally BERLINER, supra note 109 (providing state-by-state data on eminent
domain "abuse").
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recent years, technology has enabled oil and gas companies to
begin developing the estimated thirty trillion cubic feet of coal-
bed methane ("CBM") gas that underlies the Powder River Ba-
sin in eastern Wyoming and Montana. 14 1  There are over
15,000 CBM wells operating in the Powder River Basin with
20,000 to 50,000 more expected in the next ten years. 142
CBM development has created new conflicts for ranchers
and other property owners because in order to release the
methane gas, it is necessary to discharge millions of gallons of
groundwater into surface streams and ditches. This water,
which is quite saline, can interfere with surface owners' use of
their lands and harm crops, hayfields, and other ranchlands. 
143
In Wyoming, private oil and gas companies can exercise emi-
nent domain authority to take private property to access these
resources, including taking land for drilling, production, reser-
voirs, drains, ditches, and other means of discharging wa-
ters. 1 Moreover, Wyoming currently has no limit on the
quantity of water that can be discharged, resulting in a situa-
tion where surface owners feel that there is nothing to stop de-
velopers from taking whatever private property they need to
141. See KRISTIN KEITH ET AL., MONTANA STATE UNIV.-BOZEMAN,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: COAL BED METHANE 2 (2003),
http://waterquality.montana.edu/docs/methane/cbmfaq.pdf.
142. See RUCKELSHAUS INST. OF ENV'T AND NATURAL RES., supra note 125, at
5-6; J. Benjamin Winburn, Comment, The Coalbed Methane Boom: The Push for
Energy Independence Raises Questions About Water and the Rights of American
Homesteaders, 19 TUL. ENV. L.J. 359, 364 (2006) (noting "CBM methane produc-
tion in the United States has skyrocketed in the past decade" and the Bureau of
Land Management "forecasts an estimated 51,000 CBM wells in the [Powder
River Basin] over the next 10 years" (internal quotation omitted)); Environmental
Working Group, Who Owns the West: Oil and Gas Leases (Aug. 24, 2004),
www.ewg.org/oil-and-gas/part9.php.
143. See, e.g., Gary C. Bryner, Coalbed Methane Development: The Costs and
Benefits of an Emerging Energy Resource, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 519, 533-41
(2003) (discussing the environmental impacts of coalbed methane development);
Winburn, supra note 142, at 370-72 (discussing controversies over production of
water from coalbed methane wells); Samantha Bohrman, Comment, Groundwater
Conservation and Coalbed Methane Development in the Powder River Basin, 24
LAW & INEQ. 181, 187-88 (2006) (discussing the impact of coalbed methane gas
extraction on surface water, irrigated crops, and groundwater).
144. See WYO. CONST. art. I, § 32; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-815 (2007); Wyoming
Resources Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 49 P.3d 999, 1003-04 (Wyo. 2002) (holding
private mineral developer had right under state law to condemn private lands for
roads and water discharge associated with CBM development); see also supra
notes 18 & 25 and accompanying text.
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extract the gas and reap significant profits at the expense of
private property owners. 145
This state of affairs led Wyoming to pass an eminent do-
main reform law in 2007 that focuses primarily on providing
new landowner rights in all condemnation proceedings,
whether initiated by the government or private industry. Spe-
cifically, the Wyoming law requires new negotiation. protocols
between condemning parties and landowners, provides for the
recovery of attorneys' fees if the condemning party refuses to
negotiate in good faith, and expressly allows rural landowners
to use comparable sales of easements and other property inter-
ests to help define fair market value. 146 A provision of the law
also addresses economic development takings by limiting the
ability of state and local governments to take private property
for the purpose of transferring it to another private person or
entity. 147 Despite this new limit on economic development tak-
ings, the law as a whole focuses on "condemnors," rather than
public entities, thus creating reforms that will apply equally to
public and private condemning authorities.
Notably, despite the fact that traditional economic devel-
opment takings are essentially nonexistent in Wyoming, inter-
est groups in the state relied on the anti-Kelo groundswell to
build support for the legislation. The Landowners Association
of Wyoming, one of the primary interest groups pushing for
eminent domain reform in the state, highlights the Kelo case in
its online materials and then explains why condemnation is
"really a problem in Wyoming" by giving examples of eminent
domain abuses. 148 The group cites a few instances of govern-
ment condemnations for public buildings or highways (which
meet any definition of public use) but then focuses on condem-
nations by oil and gas companies for coalbed methane water
145. See Tripp Baltz, Wyoming Government Rejects Rules on Water Produced
by Coal Bed Methane Operations, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP., Apr. 25, 2007, at A-10.
146. See 2007 Wyo. Sess. Laws 139 (codified in scattered sections of WYO. STAT.
ANN. titles 1, 15, 16); see also Annie O'Brien, Governor Signs New Eminent Do-
main Bill, PINEDALE ROUNDUP, Mar. 9, 2007, available at
http://www.pinedaleroundup.com/fe-view-article-window.php?story-id=222&page
_id=72&heading=0 (discussing provisions of the 2007 eminent domain reform law
in Wyoming).
147. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801(c) (2007).
148. Landowners Association of Wyoming, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://web.archive.org/web/20070531064702/www.wyominglandowners.org/faqs/in
dex.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
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discharge, gas pipelines, and other natural resource develop-
ment takings. 149
The Landowners Association of Wyoming uses these ex-
amples not to advocate for eliminating natural resource devel-
opment takings, but to argue for greater procedural protections
and just compensation. 150 The group specifically points to
Wyoming's "tremendous burst in economic activity" as "causing
an increase in the number of eminent domain [actions] by pri-
vate entities . . ." 151 It then states that the "heightened public
attention caused by Kelo" allows the state legislature to re-
evaluate the state's eminent domain law "to facilitate economic
growth all-the-while providing adequate protection of private
property rights."152 The eminent domain reform experience in
Wyoming calls into question the Institute for Justice's assur-
ances that Wyoming landowners are "safe" from economic de-
velopment takings. 153 While they may be safe from Kelo-type
urban redevelopment takings, they experience regularly the
threat of natural resource development takings.
Newspaper articles covering eminent domain reform
throughout the Interior West similarly focus on statutory re-
forms that would better protect landowners from natural re-
source development takings as opposed to government takings.
One news article describes the burst of eminent domain reform
efforts in Interior West states such as Colorado, New Mexico,
and Utah and concludes that "[m]any of these reform bills
stress fair compensation for landowners, protecting them
against companies that could be preying on landowners with-
out the means to fight."154 A Wyoming news article declares
that property owners in the state, particularly ranchers, "are
demanding reform of the state's eminent domain laws to pro-
tect what they say might be a dying Western value." 155 After
detailing landowner complaints about coalbed methane compa-
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
154. Eminent Domain Reform Sweeps Western States, HEADWATERS NEWS,
Feb. 26, 2007, available at http://www.newwest.net/topic/article/eminent-domain_
reform_sweepswesternstates/C37/L37/.
155. Dustin Bleizeffer, Property Power Struggle, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Jan.
1, 2007, available at http://casperstartribune.net/articles/2007/01/01/news/
wyoming/61dabdd4fe2d83cd87257255002687df.txt.
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nies abusing the power of eminent domain, the article describes
the fight as one between the booming energy economy and the
need for smart growth and land preservation. 156  Another
Wyoming article describes the new state law in detail without
ever mentioning the limits on government condemnation au-
thority. Instead, it focuses exclusively on the provisions of the
law that grant landowners additional rights in natural re-
source development takings. 157
The changes to eminent domain laws in these states, par-
ticularly in Wyoming, are important property rights reforms
that serve to readjust the power balance between natural re-
source companies and landowners. Such efforts are consistent
with a system of property allocation that shifts, albeit slowly,
as the region's identity, economy, and values shift.
C. Related Property Reforms in the West: Surface Owner
Accommodation Laws
In addition to eminent domain reform, there have been
significant reforms in state common law and statutory law that
have begun to realign the power balance between natural re-
source development companies and surface owners in the Inte-
rior West. These changes may be even more significant than
the eminent domain reforms because they go to the heart of the
issue of how to reallocate property interests in a region that
has one foot in an extractive economy and another in an econ-
omy based on open space, recreation, and residential amenities.
Much of the land in the Interior West is in "split-estate"
ownership, meaning one party owns the surface rights of the
land and another party owns the subsurface and mineral
rights. In Montana, for example, 90 percent of the federally-
owned coalbed methane reserves are located under privately-
owned surface lands. 158 In Wyoming, it is estimated that
nearly half of privately-owned land is held in split-estate. 159
The creation of split-estate lands began with the Stock Raising
156. See id.
157. O'Brien, supra note 146.
158. Robert J. Duffy, Political Mobilization, Venue Change and the Coal Bed
Methane Conflict in Montana and Wyoming, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 409, 414
(2005).
159. Landowners Association of Wyoming, Oil and Gas Drilling on Split Estate
Lands, www.wyominglandowners.org/splitestates/index.php (last visited Feb. 16,
2008).
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Homestead Act of 1916160 and the Taylor Grazing Act of
1934.161 These laws were enacted so that the U.S. Government
could convey western lands for ranching and agriculture while
still retaining the right to develop the coal and other minerals
underlying these lands. 162 The U.S. Government has since
leased or sold many of these retained mineral rights to private
natural resource development companies. 163 Where land is
held in split-estate, disputes between mineral rights holders
and surface owners are inevitable.
Until recently, the law had been fairly settled with regard
to the rights of mineral owners and surface owners. As a mat-
ter of common law, the mineral estate was the "dominant" es-
tate and the mineral owner had the right to use that portion of
the surface estate reasonably necessary to develop the severed
mineral interests. 164 In addition, the owner of the mineral
right was not liable for surface damage in the absence of negli-
gence unless there was a contractual agreement to pay dam-
ages or a statute providing a right to damages. 165 Moreover,
any recoverable damages often were limited to damages to
"crops" and "improvements" and did not include damages to
natural vegetation, non-agricultural buildings, or general loss
of land value. 166
Starting in the 1970s, however, a few courts began to adopt
forms of the "accommodation doctrine" which required mineral
owners to accommodate surface owners to the fullest extent
possible. This meant that if the method of developing mineral
rights would preclude or impair surface uses and there were
reasonable alternatives available to develop the mineral that
160. 43 U.S.C. § 291 (1970) (reserving "all minerals") (repealed 1976).
161. Id. § 315g(c) (reserving "all minerals to the United States") (repealed
1976).
162. See JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAw 1040-41 (2006).
163. See generally id. at 990-1043 (discussing government leasing of oil, gas,
coal, and other mineral rights).
164. See, e.g., Gerrity Oil & Gas Co. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 926 (Colo. 1997)
(noting mineral owner has right to reasonable use of the surface); Mingo Oil Pro-
ducers v. Kamp Cattle Co., 776 P.2d 736, 740 (Wyo. 1989).
165. See EOG Resources v. Turner, 908 So. 2d 848, 854-55 (Miss. Ct. App.
2005); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms, 703 P.2d 894, 897 (N.M. 1985); see also
Wyo. Outdoor Council v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1245-47 (D.
Wyo. 2005) (recognizing that surface owners have limited ability to control the ac-
tivities of drilling companies on their lands).
166. See Gilbertz v. United States, 808 F.2d 1374, 1380 (10th Cir. 1987) (de-
scribing the limitation of compensation for surface owners under the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act).
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would not preclude or impair surface uses, such alternatives
must be used. Under the doctrine, any interference with sur-
face rights that could have been avoided through reasonable al-
ternatives constituted a trespass for which damages could be
recovered. 167
State legislatures have now begun to adopt the accommo-
dation doctrine by statute. For example, in 2005, Wyoming
adopted the Surface Owner Accommodation Act, which pro-
vides additional protections to surface owners during oil and
gas development. The law codifies the doctrine of "reasonable
accommodation," requires thirty days' written notice to obtain
access to private lands to begin oil and gas operations, and re-
quires that oil and gas operators attempt to negotiate a surface
agreement with landowners regarding oil and gas activities. 168
The law also grants landowners the right to compensation for
economic loss caused by oil and gas activity, including lost land
value, loss of value of improvements, and loss of production and
income. 169 New Mexico and Colorado have followed suit and
passed surface owner accommodation laws in 2007.170
A news article from 2005 cites the natural gas boom as
"causing tension across the American West" by pitting oil and
gas companies against ranchers and other surface owners. 171
Unlike tensions in prior decades, where energy interests
tended to dominate, recent legislation shows that other inter-
ests are gaining power. In an article reporting on New Mex-
ico's 2007 surface owner accommodation law, Governor Bill
Richardson said that the law shows the state is "an energy
producer with sensitivity to the land and property rights and
167. See Gerrity Oil & Gas Co., 946 P.2d at 927; Getty Oil v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d
618, 622 (Tex. 1971); Trenolone v. Cook Exploration Co., 166 S.W.3d 495, 498-99
(Tex. App. 2005).
168. WYO. STAT. § 30-5-402 (2007).
169. See WYO. STAT. §§ 30-5-405, 406 (2007).
170. See New Mexico Surface Owner Protection Act, H.B. 827 (N.M. 2007);
Colorado Accommodation of the Rights of Surface Owners with Respect to Oil and
Gas Operators, H.B. 1252 (Colo. 2007). North Dakota and Montana statutory law
also provide for surface owner compensatory damages resulting from oil and gas
operations. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-
504 (2007). For a summary of surface owner protection laws across the country,
see Earthworks, Surface Owner Protection Legislation, Equalizing the Imbalance
Between Mineral and Surface Owners: The Case for Surface Owner Protection
Legislation, http://www.earthworksaction.org/SOPLegislation.cfm.
171. See Todd Wilkinson, Energy Boom is Crowding Ranchers, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, May 10, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/
0510/p01s02-usju.html.
2008] 687
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
property owners."' 172 Even the president of the New Mexico Oil
and Gas Association stated that "[t]his isn't your grandfather's
oil and gas industry, and we need to demonstrate that."173 On
its website, the Landowners Association of Wyoming describes
a similar shift. In explaining "what changed" so as to necessi-
tate the 2005 legislative reform, the group cites the accelerat-
ing impact of oil and gas activity in the state at a time when
"Wyoming surface land is valued higher for its amenity values
like open space, clean air and remoteness." 174
So what do these new surface owner accommodation laws
have to do with public use and eminent domain? I think a
great deal. Development of coal, oil, gas, and other mineral re-
sources in western states is still an important part of many of
those states' economies and is integral to their culture and his-
tory. As a result, efforts to eliminate or significantly limit au-
thority for natural resource development takings will meet
with major resistance. Surface owner accommodation laws, on
the other hand, give additional bargaining power, property
rights, and leverage to surface owners without creating sub-
stantial roadblocks to natural resource development.
This approach is similar to what many states have done
with economic development takings and public use. Few states
have abolished economic development takings entirely despite
strong pressure to do so. 175 Instead, they have increased scru-
tiny of such takings, provided for attorneys' fees in cases where
condemnation authority was used in bad faith, allowed for ad-
ditional compensation rights, and otherwise re-set the playing
field between public condemning authorities and private prop-
erty owners. 176
172. See Deborah Baker, Surface Protection Bill Signed into Law, FREE NEW
MEXICAN, Mar. 8, 2007, http://www.freenewmexican.com/news/58227.html.
173. Id.
174. Landowners Association of Wyoming, Oil and Gas Drilling on Split Estate
Lands, http://www.wyominglandowners.org/splitestates/index.php (last visited
Feb. 21, 2008).
175. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 105. The Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures and Castle Coalition websites provide a
summary of state eminent domain reform across the country and list only Florida,
North Dakota, and South Dakota as virtually eliminating economic development
takings as opposed to merely placing limits on such takings. See 50 STATE
REPORT CARD, supra note 105, (giving only Florida, North Dakota, and South Da-
kota an "A" for their eminent domain reform with New Mexico receiving an A-).
176. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1133 (2007) (requiring condemnor to
provide comparable replacement dwelling or compensation necessary to purchase
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In both sets of reforms, the goals are the same but there
are different local problems to be addressed. In urban areas,
state legislatures and courts are responding to perceived
abuses by limiting government authority to use the power of
eminent domain to engage in urban redevelopment projects. In
less urban parts of the Interior West, particularly in Wyoming,
state legislatures and courts are responding to perceived
abuses by forcing both public and private condemning authori-
ties to pay more in the way of compensation, work with surface
owners, and otherwise negotiate in good faith. In each case,
courts and state legislatures have attempted to tailor their re-
forms to the specific practices and needs of the community.
IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: REFORMING NATURAL RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS
This is a critical time to be reflecting on property rights
both in the Interior West and throughout the rest of the coun-
try. The nation as a whole is struggling with energy needs,
climate change, and a host of other concerns that rest in large
part on how to best use and allocate property and resources.
The public reaction to Kelo is merely one example of the cur-
comparable dwelling when an individual's principal residence is taken); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1135 (2007) (awarding attorneys' fees when condemnation
found not to be for a public use); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2 (2007) (landowner may
apply for re-conveyance of property or be entitled to additional compensation if
condemned property is not put to a public use); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-1-14
(2007) (awarding landowner attorneys' fees and litigation expenses if damages
awarded at trial are greater than amount specified in condemnor's settlement of-
fer); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5 (2007) (condemnor must pay 150% of the market
value if taking a residence, 125% of the market value if taking agricultural land,
and in all condemnations must pay for relocation expenses and any related loss to
landowner's business or trade); Mo. REV. STAT. § 523.039 (2007) (requiring con-
demnor to pay 125% of market value when taking a "homestead" and 150% of
market value when taking property that has been utilized in the same manner
and owned within the same family for 50 or more years); Mo. REV. STAT. §
523.256 (2007) (condemnor must pay landowner's attorneys' fees and condemna-
tion petition will be dismissed if condemnor fails to conduct good faith negotia-
tions); MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (2007) (court shall award landowner attorneys' fees
and expenses if compensation judgment is 40% greater than condemnor's last
written offer prior to filing the petition or if the court determines the taking is not
for a public use, and court may award landowner attorneys' fees and expenses if
compensation judgment is at least 20% but not more than 40% greater than con-
demnor's last written offer); MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2007) (condemnor must pay a
landowner forced to relocate compensation sufficient to purchase comparable
property in the community).
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rent focus on these concerns. The Kelo debate, however, has fo-
cused too narrowly on government takings and so far has
missed the opportunity for a broader discussion about the role
of eminent domain in allocating property. This Part argues for
more widespread reform of natural resource development tak-
ings based on the diverse needs of specific states or regions.
A. Diverse Reforms for Diverse State Needs
The issue of eminent domain and public use remains as
complex and varied as it was in the early twentieth century,
with different approaches needed for different geographic re-
gions. The need for different solutions in different states is il-
lustrated in part by the wide variation in state approaches to
eminent domain reform both prior to and since Kelo. Some
states have significantly reduced or virtually eliminated eco-
nomic development takings, others grant broad authority for
such takings, and others have focused on improving procedural
protections for both public and private takings. 177 Arguably,
these differences reflect the different needs of different states.
For instance, it may be that the difficulty of assembling land in
densely populated areas of the country such as New York and
California is the reason why those states have not placed addi-
tional limits on economic development takings since Kelo. 178
By contrast, in North Dakota, South Dakota, and other areas
with less urban density, land assembly may not be as difficult
and states can perhaps "rein in" government authority for eco-
nomic development takings without significant adverse conse-
177. See ECHEVERRIA, supra note 112.
178. See Brief for American Planning Association et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), 2005 WL
166929 (arguing that because conditions that might justify the exercise of eminent
domain vary greatly from one part of the country to another a single federal rule
binding on all states is not appropriate); 50 STATE REPORT CARD, supra note 105
(giving a grade of "F' to New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey; a grade of "D-"
to California; and a grade of "A" to North Dakota and South Dakota for eminent
domain reform efforts); The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and
Other Private Property: S. Hearing on 109-208 Before the S. Comm. On the Judici-
ary, 109th Cong. 5 (Sept. 20, 2005) (testimony of Thomas W. Merrill, Professor,
Columbia University Law School) [hereinafter Merrill Testimony] (cautioning
against "a prohibitory limitation on the use of eminent domain at a federal level"
because problems in assembling property vary greatly from one part of the coun-
try to another based on urban density in some areas and rangeland conditions in
another).
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quences. 179 Thus, although eminent domain has become a
high-profile issue across the country, the form of the debate in
each state is driven by that state's past and present economics,
social fabric, and resources.
Today there is passionate public rhetoric calling for a re-
balancing of rights between natural resource development and
landowner interests in states where natural resource develop-
ment formed the states' economies and cultural identities. The
question remains, however, whether it is time for states in the
Interior West to go beyond "the edges" of eminent domain re-
form and reconsider directly the constitutional and statutory
provisions declaring natural resource development takings a
per se public use. When these provisions were enacted in the
early twentieth century, natural resource development was un-
rivaled as the economic driver for the region. Although natural
resource development remains an important part of many of
these states' economies, it now competes with high-tech indus-
tries, recreational tourism, preservation needs, and residential
development in shaping the future of the region. 180 In light of
this reality, the per se public use designation for natural re-
source development may no longer be an appropriate mecha-
nism for reallocating property rights.
Any proposal for reform in this area must consider that
during these states' constitutional conventions, the delegates
intended to take the question of public use out of the hands of
the state legislatures and state courts, not trusting those gov-
ernmental bodies to give the interests of industry sufficient
weight over individual property interests that might act as ob-
stacles to economic progress.181 Now, however, perhaps what
is needed is the creation of a political forum to weigh the state's
interest in natural resource development against the interests
179. Douglas W. Kmiec, The 2006 Templeton Lecture Proceedings: Eminent
Domain Post-Kelo, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 501, 528 (2007) (comments of Thomas
Merrill, stating that South Dakota can easily enact legislation restricting the use
of eminent domain for any but "traditional public uses" because "there's a lot of
empty land in South Dakota and you don't really need to use eminent domain...
to assemble parcels of land to do much of anything" but that it is a very different
situation in urban areas on the East Coast).
180. See TRAVIS, supra note 136, at 3 (stating that most of the development oc-
curring in the West, including the Interior West, has little to do with natural re-
source extraction and that "[an economically diverse postindustrial regime of ser-
vices, information technology, light manufacturing, tourism, and retirement now
drives growth.").
181. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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not only of individual property owners but also of competing
economic, environmental, and social drivers.
Municipal, county, or other local governmental entities in
each of these states could serve that purpose. Under such a
system, when a natural resource development company wished
to exercise the power of eminent domain, it would make its
case to the designated city, county, or other local governmental
entity as to why the taking was for a public use and would bear
the burden of proof on that issue. In the public proceeding that
followed, the individual landowners affected, along with repre-
sentatives of environmental interests, governmental interests,
and other economic interests, could make their case as to why
the taking was not for a public use. The decision-maker would
weigh the various interests based on the record created and
make a decision in the best interests of the community-taking
into account the local government's land use planning docu-
ments, the desires of the community, the impact of the natural
resource development on the economy, and competing economic
and social concerns. This decision would then be subject to ju-
dicial review, with deference to the decision-making body.
This proposal is not unique, in that it resembles the proc-
ess that exists or is being adopted in many states for when gov-
ernmental authorities exercise the power of eminent domain
for economic development takings. Under that process, the
governmental entity makes its own political decision after a
public hearing on the question of whether a taking is for a pub-
lic use. 182 It then seeks judicial approval of the taking, at
which time the court reviews whether or not the taking is for a
public use. 183 In this way, there is a political determination of
public use followed by judicial review of that determination.
Even in Kelo, for instance, there were numerous studies, public
hearings, environmental and social reviews, and alternatives
analyses before New London granted its non-profit develop-
ment arm authority to exercise eminent domain in its name to
182. See, e.g., Housing and Redev. Auth. v. Richfield, 630 N.W.2d 662 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001) (discussing statutory requirements for local government to take
private property for economic development as a "public purpose" and judicial re-
view of local government finding); Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement
in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private In-
fluence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31-33 (2006) (describing government takings as
subject to public accountability and requiring various regulatory approvals).
183. See supra note 182 and accompanying text; infra note 184 and accompa-
nying text.
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acquire the necessary property. 184 Indeed, Justice Stevens's
majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurrence relied
heavily on New London's public process and detailed record of
decision in affirming New London's determination of public
use. 185 As Nicole Garnett has noted, the Court's emphasis on
the planning process in Kelo may result in a greater focus on
this issue in future cases. 186 It is likely that state and local
governments will come to rely more heavily on the planning
process to better insulate themselves from constitutional chal-
lenges by landowners and, likewise, courts may more closely
scrutinize government claims of "public use" that take place
outside a public planning process. 187
The review, public comment, and creation of a reviewable
administrative record in Kelo exemplifies a public process that
simply does not exist for many natural resource development
takings today. Instead, in the Interior West, a natural re-
sources development company can go directly to court to obtain
property by eminent domain. Such companies thus bypass any
political determination of public use, and often have no consti-
tutional or statutory obligation to create any administrative re-
cord that allows for meaningful judicial review. 188 Because
natural resource extraction is a per se public use, private natu-
ral resource companies avoid any political balancing of compet-
ing interests. Governmental entities, by contrast, must go
through a comprehensive process prior to exercising condemna-
tion authority for economic development purposes. While this
broad authority for private industry may have made sense at
the dawn of the twentieth century, it is not as clear that every
natural development taking is always a "public use" today
184. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473-74 (2005).
185. See id. at 483-84 (focusing on "the comprehensive character of the plan,
the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of [the
Court's] review" in finding that the taking satisfied the public use requirement of
the Fifth Amendment); id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he
city complied with elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate review of the
record and inquiry into the city's purposes.").
186. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443,
454 (2007).
187. Id. See also 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F.
Supp. 2d 1123, 1129-31 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that city's proposed taking was
not for a "public use" because city failed to justify its blight designation and the
need for the taking in its public hearings and proceedings prior to filing the con-
demnation lawsuit).
188. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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when balanced against a community's other economic, envi-
ronmental, and social interests.
Reforming natural resource development takings will not
happen easily. In many states it will require amending the
state constitution; in other states, only statutory amendments
will be required. In either case, natural resource companies
still wield significant political power in the region. 189 While
these hurdles may seem high, the public reaction to Kelo has
focused attention on eminent domain and public use in a way
not seen since the states in the Interior West enacted their con-
stitutional provisions on the subject nearly 100 years ago. In-
deed, since Kelo, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, and South Carolina all have
amended their state constitutions to place limits on govern-
ment condemnation authority. 190 Now may be the time for
states in the Interior West to amend their own constitutions
and statutes to focus not on government condemnations, but on
private condemnations that no longer fit the growing economic
and social complexities in many parts of the region. For those
states that undertake such an effort, it will allow state legisla-
tures and state courts to engage in the legislative and judicial
consideration of public use that courts in the rest of the country
began nearly 100 years ago. 191
B. Eminent Domain Reform Proposals for the Interior
West
In states that do attempt to undertake such reforms, there
are some helpful models to follow. Since the Kelo decision,
many states have enacted laws focused not only on limiting
economic development takings but also on strengthening the
procedural aspects of condemnation proceedings. These addi-
tional procedures include providing greater public notice, pro-
viding more public hearings, requiring good-faith negotiation
with property owners, and requiring elected bodies to approve
189. See id.
190. See 50 STATE REPORT CARD, supra note 105.
191. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text (discussing judicial decisions
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries outside of the Interior West
that considered whether to uphold legislation allowing natural resource develop-
ment interests to take private property for roads, tramways, and other projects
that would enhance resource production).
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all proposed condemnations. 192  For instance, Utah has
amended its eminent domain statute to require the legislative
body of the relevant city, county, or town to approve each tak-
ing, and to require that prior to each expected vote of that
body, every owner of property subject to condemnation will re-
ceive written notice of the meeting and be provided an oppor-
tunity to be heard. 193 Moreover, any person who seeks to ac-
quire property by eminent domain must make a reasonable
effort to negotiate with the property owner for the purchase of
that property and advise the property owner of his or her rights
to mediation and arbitration. 194 Colorado law now states that
the condemning authority must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the taking is for a public use and, for eco-
nomic development takings, must meet its burden of proof by
"clear and convincing evidence." 195 Delaware law now requires
that property can only be condemned for a "public use" if, six
months in advance of the initiation of condemnation proceed-
ings, the condemning authority establishes the taking is for a
public use through a planning document, a public hearing on
acquisition of the property, or in a public report by the
agency. 196
These types of procedural reforms do not prohibit con-
demning authorities from obtaining land in connection with
economic development and other takings, but do create a more
public process in which to debate the merits of the taking and
place a higher burden on the condemning authority to justify
the taking. Indeed, many of these reforms may seem obvious
in today's administrative state where notice, hearings, public
comment, and the creation of an administrative record have
been integral parts of federal and state agency decision-making
192. See, e.g., Patricia Salkin, Eminent Domain Legislation Post-Kelo: A State
of the States, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10864, 10865 (Nov. 2006) (discussing state re-
forms); ECHEVERRIA, supra note 112 (describing the approaches states have taken
to eminent domain reform since Kelo); U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN:
INFORMATION ABOUT ITS USES AND EFFECT ON PROPERTY OWNERS AND
COMMUNITIES IS LIMITED 40-41 (Nov. 2006) (stating that after the Kelo decision,
twenty-four states changed their eminent domain procedures or added new re-
quirements and discussing the details of some of these new state procedures).
193. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-4 (2007).
194. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-4.5 (2007).
195. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-101(2)(b) (2007).
196. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9505(15) (2005).
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for decades. 197 In the Interior West, even more than in the rest
of the country, the ability of a private party to go directly to
court to condemn property with no prior public forum on the
taking, no elected body making the decision, and no real judi-
cial review seems inconsistent with the idea that such takings
are "for a public use" or in the interests of the public at all.
Creating a public forum to debate what is actually in the pub-
lic's interest makes sense in a time and place where natural re-
source development no longer completely dominates these
states' economies or cultures.
Some scholars have suggested that state and local govern-
ments should move beyond eminent domain reform and adopt a
review process for public use decisions similar to that contained
in the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") or the
many state environmental review statutes modeled on
NEPA. 198 Under most state environmental review statutes,
the state agency proposing a public project-or considering ap-
proval of a permit for a private project-with potential envi-
ronmental impacts must conduct a review of those impacts
prior to authorizing the project or granting the permit. 199 This
197. See Merrill Testimony, supra note 178, at 7 (observing that most states'
eminent domain procedures were adopted in the nineteenth century "and have
scarcely been modified since").
198. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347
("NEPA") (2000); Merrill Testimony, supra note 178, at 7 (proposing that govern-
ments adopt a NEPA-type process to all exercises of eminent domain and that
such a process "requiring open, public, participatory inquiries into the need for
the exercise of eminent domain would . . . provide better protection for property
owners ... [and] allow the real objections to the project to come to the fore, would
create a mechanism for identifying way [sic] to proceed that would involve less or
no use of eminent domain, and would allow property owners a forum in which to
voice their objections to being uprooted."); Asmara Tekle Johnson, Correcting for
Kelo: Social Capital Impact Assessments and the Re-Balancing of Power Between
"Desperate" Cities, Corporate Interests, and the Average Joe, 16 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 187, 216-28 (2006) (proposing that states establish as a matter of
statutory law or common law a NEPA-type process that would require a "social
impact" study of economic development takings in advance of commencing the
eminent domain process to create a public forum that considers the land use, so-
cial impact, potential mitigation, and various economic impacts of the taking).
199. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
903-06 (2002) (describing basic goals and effects of NEPA and the fact that nu-
merous states have adopted their own environmental review laws to ensure envi-
ronmental impacts are reviewed in connection with state and sometimes local
governmental decisions); Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalization,
and a Proposal for an Interstate Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 79-81 (2008) (describing the NEPA process and report-
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review generally consists of preparing an environmental review
document (in the form of an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS"), Environmental Assessment ("EA"), or other similar
document), giving notice of the preparation to the public and
environmental agencies, soliciting comments, and responding
to those comments. 20 0 Beyond preparing the environmental
review document itself, state agencies must "identify and con-
front the environmental consequences of their actions, about
which they otherwise would remain ignorant," make available
background information to the affected community, and con-
sider alternatives to the proposed project. 20 1  This process
serves to open government decisions to a high level of public
scrutiny and creates political consequences for state and local
decision-making. 202 In some states, namely California, New
York, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and Washington, the envi-
ronmental review laws apply not only to state decisions with
potential environmental impacts but also to local zoning, land
use, and eminent domain decisions. 20 3 Other states have cre-
ated additional review and public hearings at the state's envi-
ronmental quality council in cases where a condemning author-
ity seeks to take land within a wetland preservation area,
agricultural preserve area, or other environmentally-sensitive
area. 204
The federal and state environmental review process is cer-
tainly not without its critics. Many in the public and private
ing that thirty-two states have some form of an environmental impact assessment
policy modeled after NEPA).
200. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
POLICY 235-38, 322-23 (5th ed. 2007) (describing EA and EIS process and state
environmental review laws); Johnson, supra note 198, at 219-20 (describing EA
and EIS process).
201. See Hall, supra note 199, at 79-80.
202. Johnson, supra note 198, at 220-21 (noting that the success of NEPA has
been its ability to influence decision-making, give structure to public debate con-
cerning projects of environmental import, and allow community groups to partici-
pate in the decision-making process in a way that was not possible prior to
NEPA).
203. See GLICKSMAN, supra note 200, at 322-33 (describing state environ-
mental review laws and their application in some states to local planning and
land use regulations); Hall, supra note 199, at 81 (same).
204. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 40A.122 (2007) (special procedures for proposed
eminent domain action for land with a total area over ten acres within an agricul-
tural preserve area); MINN. STAT. § 103F.614 (2007) (special procedures for pro-
posed eminent domain action for land with a total area over ten acres within a
wetland preservation area).
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sector consider the process to be a costly and pointless "paper-
work" exercise that unnecessarily delays or stops meritorious
development projects without resulting in better decision-
making.205 There is certainly room for reform at both the fed-
eral and state level. Nevertheless, one important outcome of
the environmental review process is that there is a public fo-
rum to debate competing economic interests, environmental in-
terests, governmental interests, and other interests prior to a
final decision or a commitment of resources. This is particu-
larly true at the local level, where private development projects
(for natural resource development or otherwise) can often make
their way through the approval process with limited opportu-
nity for public debate.
States in the Interior West could use environmental review
laws as a model and adopt legislation that requires all use of
eminent domain for economic or natural resource development
purposes (or, in the alternative, only the use of eminent domain
by private parties) to trigger a "public use review" proceeding.
As part of this proceeding the natural resource development
company or other condemning authority would apply to a state
or local government body for public use approval of the pro-
posed eminent domain action. 20 6 The government body would
then prepare a review document assessing the economic, social,
and environmental impacts of the proposed taking and deter-
mine whether, based on the information gathered, the taking is
for a public use. The politically-accountable state or local deci-
sion-making body could then make the public use determina-
tion with reference to the information gathered during the re-
view process and any party dissatisfied with that decision could
seek judicial review of the decision itself under an arbitrary
and capricious standard of review.
Such a process would serve the purpose of limiting, but not
prohibiting, the use of eminent domain for natural resource de-
velopment purposes. First, the mere existence of the process
would impact pre-condemnation negotiation between the par-
205. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 857 (5th ed. 2006); Karkkainen, supra note 199, at 903,
921-32 (describing deficiencies in the NEPA process).
206. In the case of a public body wishing to exercise the power of eminent do-
main for economic development purposes, the public use review would be com-
pleted prior to the public body making a finding that the exercise of eminent do-
main was for a public use.
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ties by encouraging natural resource development companies to
provide additional compensation, better terms, and other bene-
fits to landowners that would allow voluntary transactions to
replace many instances of condemnation. Second, even if the
developer ultimately determined condemnation was necessary,
the process itself gives the affected property owners and com-
munity a forum to voice their concerns and create a fuller pic-
ture of the impact of the potential taking.
The process could also contain aspects of the "certificate of
convenience and necessity" process used by federal and state
agencies to approve power plants, power lines, natural gas
pipelines, or other private resource development deemed to be
in the interests of the public. 20 7 In these cases, the utility
makes its proposal, the federal or state public entity conducts a
review of the need for-and public interest in-the project, and
consumer and environmental groups are allowed to participate
as intervenors. The public use review process would be more
limited than the certificate of need process in that the public
body would not be reviewing the need for the coal, oil, or coal-
bed methane itself (other federal or state agencies generally
conduct that review) but only the need for eminent domain in
connection with the natural resource development. Thus, look-
ing either to NEPA, the certificate of convenience and necessity
process, or existing state eminent domain reforms, there are
several models states can consider to create a forum that will
recognize current social, economic, and environmental concerns
in deciding whether a natural resource development taking is
for a public use.
With any of these types of procedures in place three things
will hopefully happen. First, natural resource development
takings will cease to be per se public uses. Instead, there will
be a forum at the state or local government level where land-
owners and interest groups can present testimony, data, and
other evidence on economic, social, recreational, and environ-
mental matters that will provide a broader perspective on
whether the natural resource development taking is in fact a
207. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1092 (2d ed. 2006); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text
(discussing process by which a natural gas company or power company obtains
the power of eminent domain in connection with receipt of a certificate of conven-
ience and necessity or other determination that the project is in the public inter-
est).
20081 699
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
public use. Second, there will be a decision by a politically-
accountable local body that weighs the competing evidence and
makes the decision on public use. Third, when the natural re-
source development company seeks judicial permission to exer-
cise the power of eminent domain, courts will have an ability
that does not exist today to review a record on the competing
economic, social, and environmental concerns in the eminent
domain proceedings. Bringing these competing concerns into
the public domain better reflects the reality of economic, social,
and environmental development in the Interior West today.
CONCLUSION
Advocates of eminent domain reform have generally
framed the issue as one of government abuse of condemnation
authority to take private property for economic development
purposes. Despite this widespread rhetoric, eminent domain as
a tool of property reallocation is not limited to government tak-
ings of private property. In the early years of the nation, states
in the Interior West conferred the mantle of "public use" on
mining, oil and gas, and other natural resource development
companies to encourage them to help create economies in diffi-
cult and inhospitable regions of the country. These private en-
tities used this power and have continued to do so even as the
West has changed to take on a new cultural and economic iden-
tity less dependent on natural resource development.
Recent eminent domain reform and other property reforms
in the Interior West illustrate how changes in economic and so-
cial dynamics have driven changes in the way the law allocates
property rights among surface owners and mineral owners and
among resource interests and non-resource interests. No state
yet, however, has addressed head-on whether it is time to move
away from the per se public use designation for natural re-
source interests in light of the changing identity of the region.
With so much focus on this area of law, coupled with the rapid
changes in the Interior West, it is time to consider the creation
of a public forum at the state or local government level to weigh
the needs of natural resource development interests against
other economic, environmental, and social interests in making
public use determinations.
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